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ABSTRACT
In this article, the author traces relations between argumentation and cultural practice. The first 
part focuses on definition of argumentation in the i n f o r m a l  l o g i c  tradition. In particular, it 
discusses argument in terms of verbal and social activity involving the use of everyday language. 
The author claims that there is no argumentation beyond language. The second part explains 
persuasive argumentation as a form of cultural practice. The persuasive arguments found in 
“social practice” can be understood as a social activity, analysable within the context of a given 
cultural system. Author refers to an approach that takes the argumentative expression as a certain 
type of communicative practice, directed towards respecting, recognising or accepting specific 
actions. The inclusion of persuasive argumentation in the “circuit of cultural activities” to be stud-
ied makes it possible to compare this type of argumentation with other social practices, and to 
posit a clear historical dimension in the study of argumentation. It also makes it possible to view 
persuasive argumentation as one of many cultural activities aimed at changing or perpetuating 
behaviours, attitudes, thinking, etc. The third part of the paper concerns the problem of human-
istic interpretation of persuasive argumentation. Author attempts to develop this intuition while 
at the same time demonstrating the problems that arise from this approach. In conclusion, the 
author tries to analyse argumentation in terms of culture theory and humanistic interpretation.
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DEFINITION OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTATION1
One of the best known definitions of argumentation sets out to define argu-
mentation as follows:
Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) 
the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward 
a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a ratio-
nal judge (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996: 1–6).
Argumentation, as understood by the authors of the above definition, is a ver-
bal and social activity involving the use of everyday language. Thus, argumenta-
tion necessarily implies the use of language. In addition, argumentation stands 
for a type of social activity. Even if it is not directly active in a specific discourse 
with at least two participants, it is always formulated with an addressee in mind. 
The authors of Fundamentals of argumentation theory (1996), cited above, also 
emphasised that formulating and justifying opinions is linked to the rational 
justification of the thesis advanced for acceptance. Argumentation presupposes 
a possible rational opponent who is open to well-argued claims.
Moreover, it refers to individual opinion and expresses an individual point 
of view. The latter is usually stated as a conclusion. It is presupposed that there 
is a difference of opinion between the parties of the discourse. A thesis justified 
in the argumentation is, by definition, controversial, while the model the argu-
mentation conforms to is that of a dispute in which those attempting to persuade 
one another to place themselves in the positions of attacker and defender.
A further feature of argumentation is that the conclusion is usually supported 
by a constellation of premises while the argument itself if always based on at 
least one premise. Another feature relates to the relationship between the stated 
argument and the acceptability of an opinion. The goal of argumentation is to 
increase the acceptability of an opinion for the audience. Finally, argumentation 
theory not only describes the structures and practices of argumentation, but also 
its final outcomes.
Argumentation theorists are interested in ways in which concrete arguments 
are defended and attacked in practice. The main difference between logicians 
and argumentation theorists is: “Argumentation theorists study the way in which 
people take up standpoints and defend these standpoints, whereas logicians tend 
to concentrate on the way in which conclusions are derived from premises” 
(van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 1996: 6).
1 The three main goals of argumentation are usually said to include: persuasion, hypothesis 
testing and the explanation of phenomena (Lambert & Urlich, 1980: 40–43). In this article, 
argumentation will be considered only in its persuasive aspect. It is worth noting that a propo-
sition is argumentative whenever it can be reduced to the formula: ‘X, and therefore Y’ or ‘Y, 
since X’. 
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The following areas of interest are usually distinguished in argumentation 
theory: formation, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. At the 
same time, a wider view is maintained, focusing on the circumstances in which 
a given argument is stated. The problems addressed in argumentation theory 
deal with the implicit elements of argumentative discourse, argumentative struc-
tures and schemes, and the status of fallacy theory.
Specific methods of identifying argumentation include, amongst others, 
searching for indicator words in the argumentative utterance that allow one to 
identify and order the conclusion and premises. These indicator words include 
those indicating that the premises of an argument precede its conclusion (for 
example: “and therefore”, “ergo”, “hence, it follows that”), as well as those that 
indicate that the conclusion precedes the premises (“because”, “as”, “for”, “since”). 
The study of the implicit elements of argumentative discourse consists, above 
all, of the identification of hidden premises and conclusions.
Problems related to argumentative schemes and structure belong to the group 
of issues linked to the standardisation of arguments. Apart from identifying 
premises, conclusions and indicator words, the steps involved in standardisa-
tion may also include searching for relationships between premises (premises 
can support a conclusion in separate, joint or composite ways). The results of 
this effort are represented with an argumentative diagram, which usually serves 
as a way of writing out complex argumentation, containing an intermediate 
conclusion and arguments. These attempts at description replace the structure 
of the Aristotelian syllogism, amongst other things. 
Fallacy theory is one of the essential components of argumentation theory. 
Introduced into the study of argumentation by Aristotle and expounded upon 
in his Topics and On sophistical refutations, fallacies have also been treated in 
contemporary argumentation theory.
ARGUMENTATION AS A FORM OF CULTURAL PRACTICE
I assume that persuasive arguments found in “social practice” can be viewed as 
a social activity, analysable within the context of a given cultural system.2 This 
implies an approach that tends toward describing persuasive arguments as in-
volved in a social balance of symbolical power through which individuals strive 
to alter their situation.
We can specify persuasive arguments — as I argue below — by considering 
them within the framework of categories applied to social activity. To a large ex-
tent, these categories define ways in which meaningful activities are performed. 
2 One of my assumptions is that the term “culture” can reasonably be applied in the plural. 
In this particular case, I refer to the cultures of societies that employ persuasive argumentation 
in order to transmit values. The notion of a cultural system is explained further on. 
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I attempt to consider argumentation, in the form in which it interests us here 
(namely as a verbal activity, persuasive in nature, taking the form of an argu-
mentative utterance), within the context of the ideal assumption that states that 
individuals behave according to their knowledge of the rules governing symbolic 
activities, while their actions can be interpreted by their reference to those rules. 
In other words, the argumentation we are concerned with here can be under-
stood as a social activity, a factually occurring communicative act.
From this point of view, regardless of the assumed theory of culture, it is 
important that the rules in question3 are actually in use. This means that the 
members of a given community apply (or have applied) these rules in practice, 
and that every member of the group can legitimately presume that they are 
known by their opponents. I am especially interested in cases where acts of 
understanding, based on such a system of rules, do indeed occur within groups. 
That is why I consider the theory of culture, and not rhetorical theory, to be the 
one explaining how persuasive arguments function. This is also why in the fol-
lowing pages I refer to an approach that sees argumentative expression as a cer-
tain type of communicative practice, directed towards respecting, recognising 
or accepting specific actions. In my opinion, this approach allows the problems 
encountered by scholars to be circumvented with a cultural studies perspective, 
when reading works by theorists belonging to the i n f o r m a l  l o g i c  current, es-
pecially Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman. It also provides an opportunity 
to introduce theoretical concepts that are new to the study of argumentation. 
The inclusion of persuasive argumentation in the “circuit of cultural activities” 
to be studied also makes it possible to compare this type of argumentation with 
other social practices, and to posit a clear historical dimension in the study of 
argumentation. It also makes it possible to view persuasive argumentation as one 
of many cultural activities aimed at changing or perpetuating behaviours, atti-
tudes, thinking, etc. Thanks to this, it also becomes possible to define the limits 
of the applicability of argumentation in communication more effectively than 
in the case of “informal logics” and to differentiate argumentation from other 
persuasive practices. This is crucial when dealing with the use of reasoning in 
a non-persuasive context or in actions that are persuasive but not argumentative. 
Moreover, placing persuasive argumentation within the context of interpretation 
makes it possible to take a critical approach to the cultural content and rules that 
it is subject to.
Persuasive arguments viewed as cultural actions have their own particular 
instructions. We can assume that the use of these rules can be indispensable 
when certain hierarchies of values are accepted by individuals or groups and are 
related to the strong vitality of shared values. This can be analysed in the case of 
sententiae, referring to Aristotle. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle indicates that a sen-
3 Those models of human conduct which make them a regular object of study.
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tentia usually relies on a certain common truth (in reference to human action). 
It does not pertain to individual facts and makes speech ethical. It is structured 
in such a way that it makes sententiae the premises or conclusions of a syllogism. 
Sententiae, said the Stagirite, should be used by people who can boast of certain 
practical experiences, practical wisdom (Arystoteles, 1988).
From this brief description of sententiae, we can infer not only their argumen-
tative structure, but also their rules of use. The age of the user of the sententiae is 
also a relevant factor insofar as these rules are concerned. Since sententiae should 
be used by older people, it becomes evident that speakers with more experience 
will be more persuasive. This example also indicates that there can be many rules 
for using sententiae.
Sophisms (fallacies), as a part of argumentation theory and other rhetorical 
theories, can also be examined from the angle of interpretative rules. It would 
seem that the perspective hitherto assumed by studies of argumentation (within 
the framework of argumentation theory) entails a problem related to the defi-
nition of the role played by fallacies in argumentative practice. In the approach 
I present, sophisms can be treated as schemes of linguistic social activity present 
in some communities, which can, in argumentative practice, be viewed as distinc-
tive procedures of persuasive linguistic action. The question remains, however, 
of whether the historic catalogue of arguments can be treated as an element of 
social practice within the framework of a specific historical and cultural setting. 
It seems that there is good reason to assume that the emergence (and use) of 
certain argumentative constructs is specific to certain times and places, based on 
the beliefs shared by the members of a given community as well as their access to 
knowledge of persuasive techniques. One example is the ad hominem argument: 
it was known in Antiquity and was reintroduced in the writings of John Locke 
thanks to its reference to the modern notion of the subject and a view of inter-
human relations based on a social contract (Hamblin, 1970). Another interest-
ing example is the “argument from authority”, found in the writings of Aristotle, 
and subsequently presented in medieval texts (Walton, 1997: 43–44).4
Below, I will try to advance the thesis that persuasive argument can be viewed 
as a definite act — a social activity, an act of speech, whose purpose is to influ-
ence (beliefs, behaviours, attitudes, etc.). I believe the persuasive argument may 
be viewed not only as a definite act — e.g., a social action, an act of speech — 
whose aim is to persuade, influence beliefs, behaviour, attitude, etc., but also as 
a phenomenon which is subject to the rules and patterns of culture. In this type 
of approach, the whole historical and theoretical background of the rhetorical 
tradition is only of interest to me insofar as this tradition can be made relative to 
4 Described by Aristotle as an instance of dialectical reasoning, in William of Sherwood 
(the thirteenth-century Introductiones in Logicam) it becomes a measure of erudition and 
conclusiveness. As an example, we may take the argument: Aristotle did not mention more 
than four principles, therefore there are only four principles.
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the subject’s knowledge, or treated as an element of a humanistic interpretation 
(Ławniczak, 1975; Ławniczak, 1983).
Such an approach involves consideration of a broader perspective. Namely, 
I assume that persuasive argumentation (as a defined action, a series or sum of 
actions defined by space and time) can be described as a cultural practice serving 
to perpetuate or to alter the acceptability of specific socially-functioning values. 
I also assume that through its products (persuasive arguments, which I under-
stand as intellectual creations), persuasive argumentation, as a social practice, 
symbolically fulfils a certain function (it increases the probability of respecting, 
accepting, and recognising the cultural values of which it is the bearer).5 
I try to describe persuasive argumentation by focusing on its “actual” use 
within social practice. I am particularly interested in how individuals justify 
their decisions and opinions. At the same time, I try to distance myself from 
ex cathedra postulates that would impose stiff norms for argumentation prac-
tice on communities. From my point of view, types of claims and the dispute 
over the “internal criteria of argumentation” are treated as attempts to impose 
axiological strictures on arguers. Subjecting an argumentative utterance to in-
terpretation allows one to examine argumentation mainly within the context 
of achieving an intended result. The point of view assumed here belongs to 
the polemic we find in the first volume of the Theory of communicative action 
(Habermas, 1999: 62–69). In the dispute presented therein, I am much more 
inclined to lean towards the “external” approach to argumentation, preferred 
by Wolfgang Klein. I am particularly interested in two aspects of his theory, 
although I only agree with the first. This component is illustrated by the fol-
lowing two citations:
The Toulmin Model is in a certain respect closer to real argumentation than the formal 
approaches he criticises, but it is a model of correct argumentation. Toulmin never conduc-
ted any empirical research on how people actually argue. This is also true of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, although of all the philosophical approaches they come closest to real 
argumentation. However, the auditoire universel, one of the central concepts, is certainly 
not a group of living people, for instance the current population of the Earth; it is a certain 
instance that it is otherwise difficult to define […] I am not concerned with what rational, 
reasonable or correct argumentation is, but with how people — in all their foolishness — 
actually argue (Klein, 1980: 9–10). 
5 In this context, we can treat persuasive argumentation functionally. In this article, I focus 
largely on its subjective aspects, while my remarks regarding the functional nature of this type 
of argumentation are general, expressing what are only certain intuitions, rather than specific 
solutions. One might immediately say that a functional approach to argumentative practice 
presupposes it to be a type of “meta-practice” (next to language practice), encompassing many 
areas of symbolic culture. But contrary to language, it is a “meta-practice” founded on socially-
functioning rules of communication. This is partly the result of assuming the rationality of the 
arguing subject — more of which later. 
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In argumentation, one tries to transpose what is doubtful for the collective (kollektiv) into 
something that is collectively binding by means of what is [already] collectively binding 
(das kollektiv Geltende) (Klein, 1980: 19).
I fully share the idea of this “external” approach to argumentation, largely be-
cause it allows the argumentative utterance to be made into a reproducible object 
of cultural study. There is a preference within this type of approach to use the 
tools of argumentation to interpret persuasive actions within a specific spatio-
temporal context, and to “release” persuasive argumentation from its practical 
and communicative (Schnädelbach, 2001), and therefore current, context.6 The 
emphasis is therefore shifted from the “subjective” creation of a persuasive argu-
ment to the reconstruction of empirically-used argumentations. This approach 
can indeed be applied, through the responsible use of the methods and means 
developed within the framework of i n f o r m a l  l o g i c. In my opinion, this per-
spective provides many interesting solutions, allowing both to draw a boundary 
between the practice of persuasive argumentation and other practices, especially 
the persuasive ones, as well as between rationality and persuasion. From this 
point of view, it is the culture of a society, rather than the theoretical structures 
imposed on argumentation, that defines the limits of applying argumentative 
techniques for persuasive purposes.
However, at this point, it is worth mentioning the differences separating the 
views of Klein from those that can be found in this article.
I believe that a systematic analysis of real argument — as any empirical analysis — makes 
it possible to extract relatively fixed regularities, according to which people exchange argu-
ments: to extract precisely the logic of argument. Moreover, I also believe that this notion 
encompasses much of what is usually understood by “the rationality of argument” (Klein, 
1980: 50).
6 To explain more fully it is worth to refer to a division proposed by Anna Pałubicka 
(2013). While discussing “the grammar of European culture” the author distinguishes be-
tween two attitudes which characterize the Euro-Atlantic cultural sphere. The first is the at-
titude of people who are more involved, who realize the values, desires, needs and beliefs. The 
second is related to the attitude of observation and distance, both in relation to the world 
and to themselves. The attitude of involvement is characterised by speech understood in the 
perspective of action. The focus on survival and a realistic attitude to the content of belief is 
a characteristic element of the involved attitude. In contrast, the attitude of the observer is as-
sociated with the perception of language understood as a system (an organized system of signs, 
specific rules of grammar, syntax and semantics). It expresses the third-person perspective of 
the researcher observing the action of the involved attitude (realized in a first-person perspec-
tive). It is used to identify the structures of a supra-individual, cultural nature. The method of 
reflection on the arguments which was proposed earlier would be associated with the perspec-
tive of the observer, not from practical-communicative involvement.
130 Paweł GAŁKOWSKI
The cultural scholar seeks a description of the argumentative procedure that 
would account for a distinctive “logic of argumentation” and allow to determine 
the criteria for “rational argument” within a specific community. In this sense, 
the l o g i c  of argumentation is equivalent to the l o g i c  o f  t h e  c u l t u r e  o f 
t h e  a r g u e r s, and it is difficult to speak of any, even relative, regularity in ar-
gumentative practice.7
My view is rather that internal standards of argumentation are part of the 
cultural principles regulating the exchange of arguments within a group. They 
are relative to it, and generated or inherited by it. Within the framework of the 
study of argumentation, I propose to study the arguments actually occurring 
and functioning, and empirically exploring the functioning rules that individu-
als and groups apply in argumentative practice. At the same time, I realise that 
this is only one of the possible approaches that have come to be accepted in 
argumentation theory, while its successful application makes it necessary to find 
a theoretical solution to the problem of “conscious games” with regard to the 
interpretative rules used by individuals creating persuasive arguments.
Applying the above reflections to a broader context, we could compare the 
assumptions necessary for an understanding of persuasive argumentation (which 
is the focus of the next few pages), with those formulated with regard to ar-
gumentation in the first volume of The theory of communicative action, where 
Jürgen Habermas defines the logic of argumentation as that which “refers not 
to deductive connections between semantic units (i.e., propositions), but to 
non-deductive relations between the pragmatic units (speech acts), of which 
arguments are composed” (Habermas, 1999: 55). He consequently differentiates 
three reasons to use argumentation: as a process, as a procedure, or as a logical 
product.8 Argumentation as a process presupposes a communicative framework, 
which is necessary for a symmetrical exchange of arguments. The nature of this 
exchange is idealised: for the sake of the inherent value of seeking truth, we 
renounce all forms of pressure and repression within it. Argumentation as a pro-
cedure concentrates on communicative interaction and specifies the positions 
from which arguments can be exchanged. Meanwhile, argumentation directed 
toward its products, attempts to provide the arguer with accurate and convincing 
tools for formulating an utterance (Habermas, 1999: 58–60).
7 The issue of a detailed consideration of the topic of the argumentation standards’ rela-
tivization to culture requires a more serious discussion than is possible within the framework 
of this article. It would be useful to compare and contrast the position referred to in the article 
with the polemical approaches, e.g. by Wittgenstein or Davidson. However, in this paper I aim 
to develop the arguments for the thesis that the rule of effective persuasion requires a reference 
to the culture arguing subjects. Culture, understood as a set of values  in a given social group.
8 Through a certain analogy to the Aristotelian canon, we might say that rhetoric stud-
ies argumentation as a process and dialectic defines argumentative procedures, while logic is 
concerned with studying the products of argumentation. 
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One can certainly argue against this view of argumentation. First, in the 
approach that I favour, I try to plead in support of not examining the logic of 
argumentation in terms of non-deductive relations between speech acts, but 
of submitting persuasive arguments, understood as speech acts, to an interpreta-
tive procedure related to the contents and rules to which a given argumentative 
utterance (especially insofar as the premises and rules employed in that argu-
mentation are concerned) is subject to. Second, I propose to always refer a given 
communicative interaction to the real communicative situation in which it took 
place, as well as the discourse it served. Third, instead of concentrating on ideal-
ised conditions of symmetry, I believe it is worthwhile to place the emphasis on 
reconstructing the previously mentioned patterns of use regulating argumenta-
tive practice. Fourth, I suggest that the moment in which an argumentative ut-
terance is created, allowing one to describe informal arguments (argumentative 
utterances), be taken into account every time. In my opinion, such an approach 
requires abstaining from defining standards that allow a “pressure-free” use of ar-
gumentation. Such standards (e.g. ethical ones), as long as they existed in a given 
argumentative situation, should be described within cultural studies.
THE ARGUMENTATIVE UTTERANCE AS AN OBJECT 
OF HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION
The cultural understanding of persuasive argumentation requires, first and 
foremost, the development of a justification for the claim that an argumentative 
utterance can be treated as an action that is subject to humanistic interpretation. 
In the subsequent part of this article, I attempt to develop this intuition, at the 
same time demonstrating the problems that arise from this approach.
The humanistic interpretation is a type of subjective-rational explanation. 
The result of applying this procedure is to answer the question: “Why did X 
perform a given act?” The answer to the question asked in these terms, in the 
humanistic interpretation, involves providing a description of an assumption of 
rationality, i.e. a description of X’s knowledge, which allows one to distinguish 
the actions performed by X and their result. The utterance in question also 
includes a description of the subject’s hierarchy of values while performing the 
action, and we assume that the result of the action in question constitutes a pre-
ferred outcome (Kmita, 1973: 23).9
9 The assumption of rationality adopted within this interpretation has an idealised na-
ture. An act of rationalisation is performed as part of the procedure in question. In our case, 
this means that rationality is taken as a methodological assumption. This approach does not 
presume that subjects are substantially rational. However, it is assumed that interpreting hu-
man actions requires an assumption of rationality. 
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We should add that in this case, we are dealing with an action that is executed 
(and has meaning) only when an individual — a receiver — capable of recog-
nising it as such, can be found within its reach, or when the finding of such an 
individual seems probable to the sender. In this sense, only actions capable of 
being interpreted remain within the purview of humanistic interpretation.10 
The key feature of actions capable of being interpreted, or the products of these 
actions, is the fact that they possess certain rules of execution that can generally 
be expressed as norms.11 Actions conforming to cultural rules include commu-
nicative rules, e.g., language or customs.
In this article, I am interested only in arguments, or more precisely argumen-
tative utterances, formulated for the purpose of persuasion and constructed with 
the intention of producing change (within the aforementioned contexts) (Lam-
bert & Urlich, 1980).12 These will always be arguments uttered in a given histori-
cal and cultural situation, and which are subject to practical evaluation. They are 
fully subject to standardisation procedures  (i.e., that is informal arguments), as 
long as they occurred within a real communicative space. I treat argumentative 
utterances as developing argumentation by bringing certain compositional and 
rhetorical components into it.
An argumentative utterance is a means of presenting a persuasive argument. 
It can be distinguished by its contextual characteristics, structural features, a per-
ceptible relationship between the statements contained in it, basic knowledge 
of the arguer’s intent or what they find controversial, etc. It seems that the no-
tion of the argumentative utterance as the basic unit subject to interpretation 
should be treated with some flexibility, i.e. we should define such an utterance 
depending on the needs and conditions of a given communicative situation.13 It 
is worth noting that both the argument aimed at persuasion and the argumenta-
tive utterance interest me as certain goal-oriented structures that are subject to 
interpretation.
Two assumptions seem to be of key importance to the domain of cultural 
studies. Firstly, that employing a persuasive argument requires respecting the 
rule for providing a justification (as a premise) for the claim put forward. Sec-
10 What this implies for the cultural study of persuasion is that for its interpretation, it 
is necessary to assume that those employing persuasion are competent in the use of its rules. 
This does not mean that effective persuasion requires the persuaded subject be conscious in 
this respect. What is more, the persuasive act often blurs the persuasive intention it carries, 
and the rules according to which it functions. This “blurring” should form part of the cultural 
description. 
11 The appropriate formula might be: “an action having such and such a meaning should 
be performed in such and such a way” (Kmita, 1973: 28).
12 Next to persuasion, as I already indicated, such purposes may include testing hypotheses 
or explaining phenomena.
13 The broadest definition of an argumentative utterance can be found in (Szymanek, 
2008: 37–45).
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ondly, that interpreting a persuasive argument requires skills relating to the use 
of its rules (for example, the conscious use of the structure of the argumentum 
ad personam). 
Three indicators of persuasion, such as influence, communication, and inten-
tion, allow one to treat the persuasive argument as the object of a humanistic 
interpretation. Such a solution allows to treat persuasion as one of the goals of 
cultural activity. I assume that the meaning, or purpose, of argumentation as an 
activity is persuasion, understood as effecting a change in beliefs, attitudes or 
behaviours. A humanistic interpretation of the persuasive layer, by definition 
attributing a particular meaning to any given activity (Kmita, 1973), either at-
tributes a given persuasive aim to a given action or will consist in the attribution 
of such an aim as an explanation. It is worth emphasizing that the situations in 
which a subject consciously and deliberately uses the social rules of reception 
would be of particular interest for interpretation. It seems that not only argu-
mentation bears traces of this, but also other communication practices, in which 
knowledge of the perception of social rules of reception needed to disseminate 
a given content, or consolidate the social position of individuals, is used.
In order to interpret something, I have to recognise an action as being subject 
to a rule (assuming that someone else has also recognised it as such). In order to 
convince someone, I have to know that someone has recognised this action, and 
consciously apply knowledge of the rules they used. On the other hand, when 
learning how to apply this, I begin to learn how to influence a situation. Finally, 
when I learn to apply the rules for my own purposes, it is important for me to 
maintain control over the recognition of the “correct” intention by the receiver.
In conclusion, an argumentative utterance as the outcome of a rational act of 
argumentation can be called the product of a cultural act. Moreover, I consider 
the argumentative utterance as a cultural act. I perceive it at once as a sign, a ver-
bal form of subjective action, geared towards change (influence), and subject 
to the rules of cultural interpretation.14 As a cultural act, such an utterance has 
a meaning that is subordinated to persuasion due to cultural rules. An argumen-
tative utterance is a cultural object that we can recognise by virtue of the cultural 
rules it is governed by, and submit to a procedure of interpretation.
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